logquill

Supply chain and security posture

What a security reviewer can rely on today. Vulnerability reporting is in SECURITY.md.

In place

Control Where
Publishing without stored secrets crates.io, PyPI, npm, RubyGems and NuGet use trusted publishing from the release workflow (Releasing)
Build provenance npm packages publish with --provenance; PyPI uploads carry attestations from trusted publishing
Tag-only releases The release workflow runs on a tag push; nothing is published by hand
Pinned actions Third-party GitHub Actions in the release workflow are pinned to a commit SHA
Dependency updates Dependabot opens weekly pull requests for Cargo and GitHub Actions
Memory safety The core forbids unsafe (unsafe_code = "forbid"); checks that need it live in an unpublished crate (a real fork, a counting allocator), and the runtime’s worker and queue tests run under miri in CI
Secret scanning .gitguardian.yaml configures scanning; .gitignore excludes key and environment files
No required runtime dependencies in the host language Python and npm packages carry the compiled core instead of pulling a dependency tree
Data minimisation Prompt and completion content is off by default; secrets and PII are redacted in Rust before any transport sees a record
Tamper evidence Optional hash-chained, signable logs, checked with logquill verify

Not a compliance guarantee

The privacy, redaction and tamper-evidence features are technical controls that commonly support compliance work (for example access, retention and audit requirements). Compliance is a property of a whole system and process, not of a library. LogQuill does not make an application HIPAA-, PCI- or GDPR-compliant.

Licences

The 3.0 line is MIT licensed (see LICENSE). Earlier Python 2.0.0 stays FSL-1.1-MIT and all other earlier releases stay MIT, as published.

Checking a release yourself